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A QUARTER-CENTURY
OF DECLINING CONFIDENCE
Susan J. Pharr, Robert D. Putnam, and Russell J. Dalton
A quarter-century ago, Michel J. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and
Joji Watanuki argued that the nations of Europe, North America, and
Japan confronted a “crisis of democracy.”1 Their starting point was a
vision, widespread during the 1960s and 1970s, of “a bleak future for
democratic government,” an image of “the disintegration of civil order,
the breakdown of social discipline, the debility of leaders, and the
alienation of citizens.”
The central thesis of the subtle, nuanced, and wide-ranging analysis
by Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki (hereafter CH&W) was that the
Trilateral democracies were becoming overloaded by increasingly
insistent demands from an ever-expanding array of participants, raising
fundamental issues of governability. Within that common framework,
the three authors offered somewhat distinct diagnoses of the problems
facing their respective regions. In Europe, Crozier emphasized the
upwelling of social mobilization, the collapse of traditional institutions
and values, the resulting loss of social control, and governments’ limited
room for maneuver. Huntington asserted that America was swamped
by a “democratic surge” that had produced political polarization,
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demands for more equality and participation, and less effective political
parties and government. His provocative therapy was to “restore the
balance” between democracy and governability. By contrast, Watanuki
argued that Japan did not (yet?) face problems of “excessive” democracy,
thanks in part to rapid economic growth and in part to its larger reservoir
of traditional values. Whatever the regional and national nuances,
however, the authors sketched a grim outlook for democracy in the
Trilateral countries: delegitimated leadership, expanded demands,
overloaded government, political competition that was both intensified
and fragmented, and public pressures leading to nationalistic paro-
chialism.
In historical perspective, the sense of crisis that permeated The Crisis
of Democracy may have reflected the confluence of two factors: first,
the surge of radical political activism that swept the advanced industrial
democracies in the 1960s, which began with the civil rights and antiwar
movements in United States and was then echoed in the events of May
1968 in France, Italy’s “Hot Autumn” later that year, and student
upheavals in Japan; and second, the economic upheavals triggered by
the oil crisis of 1973–74 that were to result in more than a decade of
higher inflation, slower growth, and, in many countries, worsening unem-
ployment. The Trilateral governments were thus trapped between rising
demands from citizens and declining resources to meet those demands.
Moreover, the legitimacy of governments was suspect in the eyes of a
generation whose motto was: “Question Authority.” CH&W warned that
these ominous developments posed a threat to democracy itself.
A quarter-century is an opportune interval after which to revisit the
issue of the performance of our democratic institutions. The intervening
years have witnessed many important developments in our domestic
societies, economies, and polities, as well as in the international setting.
Most dramatic of all, of course, was the end of the Cold War,
symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. If it did not signal the
end of history, the removal of the communist threat surely did mark the
end of a historical epoch. It transformed the fundamental underpinnings
of security alliances and eliminated the principal philosophical and
geopolitical challenge to liberal democracy and the market economy. In
some of the Trilateral countries it also coincided with, and to some extent
triggered, an intellectual and ideological revolution. In each country it
transformed domestic political calculations and alignments in ways that
are still being played out.
Economically, the decades that followed the appearance of the CH&W
volume were distinctly less happy than those that preceded it. The oil
shocks of 1973–74 and 1979–80 drew the curtain on that fortunate early-
postwar combination of high growth, low inflation, and low
unemployment. Although economists differ on the origins of the
pervasive slowdown, virtually all econometric analyses confirm the view
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of the man and woman in the street: Western economies took a turn for
the worse around 1973–74, and recovery was a slow and uncertain
process. The immediate inflationary effects of the oil crises were
overcome by means of stringent monetary policies, but the economic
malaise continued. In subsequent years, Europe had unprecedentedly
high structural unemployment, the United States endured sharply reduced
rates of real wage growth, and after 1992 Japan experienced the longest
recession in the country’s postwar history.
“Interdependence” was already widely discussed in the early 1970s,
and integration of the world economy has continued at a rapid pace in
the years since then. International trade has grown faster than gross
domestic products, and foreign investment more rapidly than either of
them. Western economies are even more porous internationally now than
when CH&W wrote, and our economic fates are even more intertwined.
Nowhere is this more true, of course, than in Europe: The European
Union has taken shape and extended its reach to an increasing number
of policy domains with stunning speed. Moreover, the rise of newly
industrializing economies challenges the competitiveness of all the
Trilateral countries. Finally, immigration from the less-developed to the
more-developed nations of the world has accelerated, creating new
difficulties and social tensions.
Socially and culturally, these decades have witnessed significant
change. Increased mobility and growing individuation have eroded
traditional family and community ties. Some observers believe that the
decline in respect for authority that CH&W underscored has continued
apace in all sectors of society; others see evidence of increased tolerance
of diversity. The role of women in economic life (and to some extent in
public life more generally) has grown. The expansion of higher education
during the 1950s and 1960s continues to boost the university-educated
share of the electorate. The electronic media have transformed how we
spend our leisure time as well as how we follow public affairs. In many
of our cities, the problems of drugs, crime, homelessness, and blight are
even more visible now than a quarter-century ago. Finally, older people
occupy a growing share of the population in all Trilateral countries,
which is certain to have major consequences for both social and economic
policy in the decades to come.
The Trilateral Democracies Today
When The Crisis of Democracy appeared, citizens in the Trilateral
world were still primarily concerned about market failure in sectors as
diverse as social services, culture, and the environment. Demands for
government intervention to redress those failures were ascendant. This
ideological climate fed the preoccupation of CH&W with governability.
As symbolized by the advent of Thatcher, Reagan, Nakasone, Kohl, and
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similar figures elsewhere, however, public concern had shifted by the
early 1980s from market failure to government failure. Responding to
and in part encouraging this sea change in public opinion, conservative
leaders proposed a reduced role for government, and this ideological
shift to the right was accelerated everywhere by the discrediting of state
socialism after 1989. Facing an altered electoral marketplace, political
leaders everywhere now call for less government—less bureaucracy,
less regulation, less public spending—although policy has yet to catch
up with rhetoric. Even a relatively liberal Democratic president in the
United States has proclaimed that “the era of big government is over.”
In one sense, the problem of “overload” identified by CH&W appears
to have solved itself: Many people seem to have concluded that
government action is not the answer to all their problems.2 Yet citizens
still hold government responsible for their social and economic well-
being, and cutting “entitlement” programs remains difficult everywhere.
Against this backdrop of geopolitical, economic, social, and ideo-
logical change, how should we assess the current status of the advanced
industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan?
At the outset we want to emphasize a distinction that CH&W felt less
need to stress: the distinction between the effectiveness of specific
democratic governments and the durability of democratic institutions
per se. On the one hand, we see no evidence in any of these countries
that democracy itself is at risk of being supplanted by an undemocratic
political regime or by social or political anarchy. On the other hand, we
do see substantial evidence throughout the Trilateral world of mounting
public unhappiness with government and the insti tutions of
representative democracy.
Earlier alarm about the stability of democracy itself—which CH&W
were in part responding to and in part amplifying—now seems
exaggerated. The happy contrast between political developments in the
advanced industrial democracies after World Wars I and II is indeed
dramatic. Within two decades after the end of World War I, fledgling
democracies had collapsed in Italy, Germany, Spain, and Japan, and
more established democracies elsewhere were under siege. Now, more
than half a century after the end of World War II, democratic regimes
are deeply rooted throughout the Trilateral world and have multiplied
in other parts of the world as well. Bearing in mind the tragic failures of
democracy in the interwar period, it was entirely natural in the first
decades after World War II for observers of Western politics to ask
whether the same thing could happen again. Political science has a poor
record of prognostication, especially with respect to radical change, and
we should not be too presumptuous in writing about such fundamental
issues, but with half a century of democratic stability under our collective
belts, the answer is almost certainly no.
The case for this optimism does not simply rest on the passage of
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time. Decades of surveys in North America, Western Europe, and Japan
yield little evidence of diminished support for liberal democracy among
either mass publics or elites. If anything, the opposite is true: Commitment
to democratic values is higher than ever.3 In sharp contrast to the period
after World War I, no serious intellectual or ideological challenge to
democracy has emerged. Whether tracked over the more than five decades
since the end of World War II or over the decade since the fall of the
Berlin Wall, opponents of democracy have lost support. Even where
public discontent with the performance of particular democratic
governments has become so acute as to overturn the party system (as in
Japan and Italy in 1993–95), these changes have not included any serious
threat to fundamental democratic principles and institutions. In this sense
we see no significant evidence of a crisis of democracy.
Nevertheless, to say that democracy per se is not at risk is far from
saying that all is well with the Trilateral democracies. In fact, public
confidence in the performance of representative institutions in Western
Europe, North America, and Japan has declined since the original
Trilateral Commission report was issued, and in that sense most of these
democracies are troubled.
Symptoms of Distress
Public attitudes toward democracy can be assessed at various levels
of abstraction. We find no evidence of declining commitment to the
principles of democratic government or to the democratic regimes in
our countries. On the contrary, if anything, public commitment to
democracy per se has risen in the last half century. At the other extreme,
we are not concerned with day-to-day evaluations of specific leaders,
policies, and governments (in the European sense of the word); we
assume that evaluations of this kind of governmental performance will
rise and fall in any well-functioning democracy. Rather, our concern is
with popular confidence in the performance of representative institutions.
Among the specific indicators we focus on are trends in: 1) attachment
to, and judgments of, political parties; 2) approval of parliaments and
other political institutions; and 3) assessment of the “political class”
(politicians and political leaders) and evaluations of political trust.
Whatever the “normal” background level of public cynicism and censure
of politics, citizens in most of the Trilateral democracies are less
satisfied—often much less satisfied—with the performance of their
representative political institutions than they were a quarter-century ago.
North America. The onset and depth of this disillusionment vary from
country to country, but the downtrend is longest and clearest in the United
States, where polling has produced the most abundant and systematic
evidence.4 (The evidence from Canada, if less abundant and dramatic,
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conforms to this general picture.) When Americans were asked in the
late 1950s and early 1960s, “How much of the time can you trust the
government in Washington to do what is right?” three-quarters of them
said “most of the time” or “just about always.” Such a response would
sound unbelievably quaint to most people
today. This decline in confidence followed
a decade or more of exceptionally turbulent
political conflict—the civil rights movement,
Vietnam, and Watergate and its successor
scandals—that transformed American
politics. Third-party challengers for the
presidency, divided government, a term-
limits movement,  and other polit ical
developments signaled the public’s
increasing disenchantment with the political
status quo.5 Public confidence in the ability
and benevolence of government has fallen
steadily over this period. The decline was
briefly interrupted by the “It’s Morning in
America” prosperity of the Reagan administration, and even more briefly
by victory in the Gulf War, but confidence in government ended up
lower after 12 years of Republican rule. Indeed, of the total decline,
roughly half occurred under Republican administrations and half under
Democratic ones. The economic prosperity of the late 1990s has seen
an uptick in confidence in government, but the figures still remain well
below those of the 1970s, not to mention those of the halcyon days of
the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Public-opinion data tell the story of this decline. For example, whereas
three-quarters of the American public once trusted the government to
do what is right, only 39 percent felt this way in 1998. In 1964, only 29
percent of the American electorate agreed that “the government is pretty
much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.” By 1984,
that figure had risen to 55 percent, and by 1998, fully 63 percent of
voters concurred. In the 1960s, two-thirds of Americans rejected the
statement “Most elected officials don’t care what people like me think”;
in 1998, nearly two-thirds of Americans agreed with it. This negative
assessment applies to virtually all parts of government. Those people
expressing “a great deal” of confidence in the executive branch fell from
42 percent in 1966 to only 12 percent in 1997, and equivalent trust in
Congress fell from 42 percent in 1966 to 11 percent in 1997.6
Almost every year since 1966, the Harris Poll has presented a set of
five statements to national samples of Americans to measure their
political alienation: 1) “The people running the country don’t really care
what happens to you.” 2) “Most people with power try to take advantage
of people like yourself.” 3) “You’re left out of things going on around
In the 1960s, two-
thirds of Americans
rejected the
statement “Most
elected officials
don’t care what
people like me
think”; in 1998,
nearly two-thirds
of Americans agreed
with it.
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you.” 4) “The rich get richer and the poor get poorer.” 5) “What you
think doesn’t count very much anymore.” Every item on this list has
won increasing assent from Americans since the opinion series began.
In the late 1960s—at the very height of the Vietnam protests—barely
one-third of Americans endorsed these cynical views; by the early 1990s
fully two-thirds of all Americans concurred. By almost any measure,
political alienation has soared over the last three decades.7 A single
comparison captures the transformation: In April 1966, with the Vietnam
War raging and race riots in Cleveland, Chicago, and Atlanta, 66 percent
of Americans rejected the view that “the people running the country
don’t really care what happens to you.” In December 1997, in the midst
of the longest period of peace and prosperity in more than two
generations, 57 percent of Americans endorsed that same view.8
Europe. Comparable public-opinion trends in Europe are more varie-
gated, but there, too, the basic picture is one of spreading disillusionment
with established political leaders and institutions. Trust in politicians
and major political institutions has fallen over the last quarter-century
in countries as diverse as Britain, Italy, France, and Sweden.
Britons’ traditional deference to elites has been replaced by growing
skepticism. In 1987, for example, fewer than half of Britons believed
that either civil servants, the national government, or local councils could
be trusted to serve the public interest.9 And while 48 percent of the British
public expressed quite a lot of confidence in the House of Commons in
1985, that figure had been halved by 1995. Public protests over
government decisions had become a common feature of politics in a
nation once known for popular deference to political elites. As a symbol
of this spreading skepticism, a series of high-profile Parliamentary
committees in the 1990s studied issues of government corruption, ethical
standards in politics, and campaign-finance abuses. Sweden, which
invented the consummate welfare state and was once widely considered
to have found a happy “middle way” between the free-for-all of market
capitalism and the oppression of state socialism, is emblematic of
Europe’s troubled mood. The proportion of Swedes who rejected the
statement that “parties are only interested in people’s votes, not in their
opinions” decreased from 51 percent in 1968 to 28 percent in 1994.10 In
1986, even after the onset of the trend of decreasing political trust, a
majority (51 percent) of Swedes still expressed confidence in the
Riksdag; by 1996, however, only 19 percent did.
Especially striking are the patterns for the postwar democracies of
Germany and Italy. Political support grew in these nations during the
postwar decades, but the trends reversed at some point, and support has
now eroded significantly from postwar highs. For instance, the
percentage of Germans who said they trusted their Bundestag deputy to
represent their interests rose from 25 percent in 1951 to 55 percent in
Journal of Democracy12
1978; by 1992, it had declined to 34 percent.11 Other survey responses
point to a general erosion of Germans’ trust in government since the
early 1980s. Similarly, student unrest and extremist violence in the 1970s
strained Italians’ postwar democratic agreement, and public skepticism
broadened and deepened with the political scandals of the past decade.
This was signaled most dramatically by the radical restructuring of the
party system in the mid-1990s. The percentage of Italians who say that
politicians “don’t care what people like me think” increased from 68
percent in 1968 to 84 percent in 1997.
At least until recently, such trends have been less visible in some of
the smaller European democracies. Still, patterns of growing political
cynicism have become more common in Austria, Norway, Finland, and
other small states during the past decade. Almost everywhere, it seems,
people are less deferential to political leaders and more skeptical of their
motives. Across Europe the pattern of declining political support has
apparently accelerated in the past decade. A recent evaluation of all the
relevant long-term evidence found “clear evidence of a general erosion
in support for politicians in most advanced industrial countries.”12
Japan. Public evaluations of politics and government in Japan reveal
similarly disturbing trends. While The Crisis of Democracy portrayed
Japan as an outlier, buffered from travails the authors saw looming
elsewhere by a deferential political culture in which state authority was
accepted,13 Japanese citizens’ disillusionment with government and
political institutions has, if anything, proven to be more persistent than
elsewhere in the Trilateral world. Japan began the postwar era with
confidence levels at a low point. With a generation of leaders discredited
by wartime defeat and with the new democratic institutions imposed by
the Occupation as yet untested, it is little wonder that political uncertainty
prevailed, as attested to by extremely high proportions of Japanese
responding “Don’t know” to survey questions. By the 1960s, confidence
in democracy per se was well established, and people’s evaluations of
government and politics had improved somewhat from these abysmal
beginnings, but they nevertheless remained low relative to those in most
other advanced industrial democracies.14 Although the mid-1980s
witnessed a brief upturn, confidence levels declined noticeably in the
politically turbulent and economically distressed 1990s. The long-term
trends toward less deference to political leaders, diminished loyalty to
established political parties (including the long-dominant Liberal
Democratic Party, or LDP), and increased political dissatisfaction all
predate the scandals that finally brought down the LDP in 1993 after 38
years of uninterrupted rule.
The proportion of Japanese voters who agree with the deferential
view that “in order to make Japan better, it is best to rely on talented
politicians, rather than to let the citizens argue among themselves” has
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fallen steadily for 40 years. Although this is probably a good indicator
of the strengthening of the cultural and sociological foundations of
Japanese democracy, the proportion of voters who feel that they exert at
least “some influence” on national politics through elections, demon-
strations, or expressions of public opinion also fell steadily between
1973 and 1993. In other words, Japanese voters have become less and
less satisfied over the last 20 years with their limited role in politics,
and less content to leave public affairs in the hands of political leaders.
This is the backdrop against which a series of political corruption
scandals broke prior to 1993, discrediting the LDP and causing public
esteem for political leadership to decline still further. In yet another
sign of a downturn in confidence, trust in the country’s once-esteemed
elite civil servants has also plummeted over the past decade.
Trends in Political Confidence
When we step back from surveying the Trilateral landscape region
by region, the overall picture that emerges is disturbing. Long series of
national-election studies and reputable commercial public-opinion
surveys provide extensive evidence of how public sentiments have
changed over time. Evidence of the decline in political support has been
especially apparent in three areas: disillusionment with politicians, with
political parties, and with political institutions.
Politicians. If public doubts about the polity surfaced only in
evaluations of politicians or the government in power at any particular
point in time, there would be little cause for worry. After all, citizens’
dissatisfaction with an incumbent government routinely spurs voters to
seek a change in administration at the next election and then extend
support to the new incumbents. In that case, disaffection is a healthy
part of the democratic process. Because citizens have the power to “throw
the rascals out,” democracy has a potential for renewal and respon-
siveness that is its ultimate strength. If dissatisfaction is generalized to
the point where citizens lose faith in the entire political class, however,
then the chances for democratic renewal are seriously diminished.
The patterns we have described separately, region by region, appear
to be common to most Trilateral democracies. When the data for recent
decades are assembled, the picture that emerges is stark (see Figure 1
on pp. 14–15). Overall, there is evidence of some decline in confidence
in politicians in 12 out of 13 countries for which systematic data are
available. The convergence of results across Trilateral democracies is
striking, because each has experienced its own unique political events
over the past quarter-century. Although the decline is not universal,15
there is a general pattern of spreading public distrust of politicians and
government among the citizens of Trilateral democracies. The political
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process undoubtedly faces strains when an increasing number of people
distrust those individuals who are running the institutions of demo-
cratic governance.
Political Parties. For more than a century, political parties have played
a central role in the theory and practice of democratic government. To
be sure, classical philosophers conceived of democracy as a kind of
unmediated popular sovereignty in which “the people” rule directly, but
they had in mind the context of a small city-state and never imagined
that democratic government could function in societies as large and
complex as today’s Trilateral nations. This hurdle of scale was overcome
by the greatest modern political innovation—representative democracy—
which required intermediary institutions to link citizens to their govern-
ment, to aggregate the increasingly diverse universe of conflicting social
and economic interests into coherent public policies, and to ensure the
accountability of rulers to the ruled. With the advent of universal
suffrage, these functions came to be performed by political parties
throughout the democratic world.
Although parties have long been the target of vociferous criticism,
without them, the eminent scholar E.E. Schattschneider once asserted,16
democracy would be unthinkable. One need not be blind to the deficien-
cies of partisanship nor romanticize the internal workings of party organi-
zations to recognize the importance of parties to representative govern-
ment. Joseph Schumpeter once defined democracy as “that institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people’s votes.”17 Although Schumpeter did not specifically emphasize
the role of parties in this competition, his theory did clarify how parties
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contribute to democracy. Just as firms in a free market are led to innovate
and to satisfy consumers by a combination of self-interest and the rules
of open competition, party competition provides the linchpin between
voters and public policy and the mechanism for turning disparate “special
interests” into some version of “the public interest.” Just as brand names
allow consumers to choose on the basis of past experience and to penalize
shoddy performance, party labels ensure that voters can reward the suc-
cessful stewardship of public affairs and punish incompetence or dis-
honesty. Partisan “brand loyalty” gives political leaders the right incen-
tives: They are free to innovate and make difficult decisions that may
be painful in the short run, while they remain accountable to their consti-
tuents in the long run. Parties, in short, make the political marketplace
orderly. Parties offer other advantages as well. They allow the voters to
rise above their feelings about individual politicians; party supporters
can be dissatisfied with a set of candidates, yet remain committed to the
party’s goals and the principle of representative democracy.
Because of the centrality of parties to democracy, people’s feelings of
attachment to or identification with political parties are one of the most
widely studied of political attitudes. Fine-tuned efforts have been made
to measure both affinities toward specific parties and acceptance of the
general system of party-based democracy.18
Signs of waning public attachment to political parties first emerged
in several Trilateral democracies during the 1970s.19 The collapse in
citizen engagement with political parties over the subsequent decades is
as close to a universal generalization as one can find in political science.
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Card-carrying membership has always been less important for American
than for European parties, but the proportion of Americans who reported
that they engaged in party work at least once during the previous year
fell by 56 percent between 1973 and 1993, and the proportion who
reported attending a campaign rally or speech fell by 36 percent over
the same period. Comparably massive declines in party membership have
been registered in most Trilateral countries over the last 25 years.20 As
attachments to political parties have eroded, electorates have become
more volatile and skeptical. A comprehensive look at this pattern of
weakening party ties,  or “dealignment,” reveals that popular
identification with political parties has fallen in almost all the advanced
industrial democracies. The percent of the public expressing a partisan
attachment has declined in 17 of the 19 Trilateral nations for which
time-series data are available. The strength of party attachments was
separately measured in 18 nations: All show a downward trend.21
Seldom does such a diverse group of nations reveal so consistent a
trend. The only major variation is in the timing of the decline.
Dealignment in the United States, Great Britain, and Sweden has been a
long-term and relatively steady process that moved partisanship to a
lower baseline level. For example, 65 percent of the Swedish public
claimed party ties in 1968, compared to only 48 percent in 1994. In
other countries, the change has been more recent. French and Irish
partisanship has eroded over the past two decades. German partisanship,
which had grown during the early postwar decades, began to weaken in
the late 1980s and dropped off markedly in the 1990s. In Canada, the
collapse of the Progressive Conservative and New Democratic Parties
in the 1993 elections accentuated a similar trend toward dealignment.
In Japan and Austria, too, detachment from parties accelerated in the
1990s, in response to a breakdown of political consensus in both nations.
Specific variations aside, the overall pattern is consistent and striking.
If party attachments represent the most fundamental type of citizen
support for representative democracy, as many scholars assert, then their
decline in nearly all advanced industrial democracies offers strong and
disturbing evidence of the public’s disengagement from political life.
Beyond reflecting dissatisfaction with politicians and current party
leaders, weakening partisan ties also signal a growing disenchantment
with partisan politics in general. For example, responses to several
questions from the American National Election Study indicate a trend
of declining faith that parties and elections are responsive to the public’s
interests.22 A variety of other evidence points to Americans’ growing
disillusionment with political parties as agents of democratic
representation.23 Along with other factors, disenchantment with political
parties fueled public demand for major electoral reforms in Japan, Italy,
and New Zealand. Across most of the Trilateral democracies, more
citizens are now maintaining their independence from political parties
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and the institutions of repre-
sentative democracy that they
represent.
Political Institutions. In the
Trilateral democracies, citizens’
skepticism about politicians and
political parties extends to the
formal institutions of democratic
government. It is one thing for
citizens to be skeptical of the
president or the prime minister
(or even the group of politicians
in parliament); it is quite differ-
ent if this cynicism broadens to
include the institutions of the
presidency and the legislature.
Because of its abundance of
long-running, high-quality public-
opinion surveys, the best evidence
once again comes from the United
States. One question gauges
confidence in the officials running
the three branches of American
government.24 In the mid-1960s,
a large proportion of Americans
expressed a great deal of confi-
dence in the Supreme Court, the
executive branch, and Congress,
but that confidence dropped dra-
matically by the early 1970s, and
slid even further for the executive
and Congress over the following
two decades. Significantly, it is the
Supreme Court, the least partisan
and political institution, that has
best retained the public’s confi-
dence. By the mid-1990s, barely a tenth of the American public had a great
deal of confidence in the people running the executive branch or Congress—
dramatic evidence of Americans’ dissatisfaction with government.
Figure 2 presents data on trends in confidence in parliament for 14
Trilateral democracies.25 Parliament is the prime institution of represen-
tative democracy, the link between citizens and elites. Thus we focus
on public images of parliament as a key institution in the structure of
democratic politics.
FIGURE 2—CONFIDENCE IN
PARLIAMENT IN 14 TRILATERAL
COUNTRIES
Netherlands, 1981–90  (1.000)
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Notes: Table entries are the per-annum
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The time coverage and the extensiveness of the evidence varies consi-
derably across nations, but the overall pattern is quite apparent. In 11 out
of 14 countries, confidence in parliament has declined. Although in a
number of cases the evidence does not rise to the level of statistical signifi-
cance (largely because of the limited number of time points), in the five
countries (Britain, Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United States)
for which the most extensive data are available, the drop in confidence
in the national legislature is both pronounced and statistically significant.
Citizens’ declining confidence in the institutions of democratic
government extends beyond parliament. A separate analysis, using the
1981 and 1990 World Values Surveys, evaluated confidence in the armed
services, judiciary, police, and civil service, as well as parliament.
Although some institutions have scored gains in public trust over time,
the general downward trajectory is clear. On average, confidence in these
five institutions decreased by 6 percent over this single decade.26 In fact,
only Denmark and Iceland displayed absolute increases in institutional
confidence during the 1980s, and those increases were small.
The trends described here are not homogeneous across all the
Trilateral countries. The degree and timing of growing distrust of political
leaders, dissatisfaction with government performance, and estrangement
from established parties vary greatly, depending on national traditions,
specific political events, the effectiveness of individual leaders, and so
on. Generally speaking, the trends are clearer in the larger countries
(and clearest of all in the largest of all) and less visible (or, in a few
cases, almost wholly absent) in some of the smallest countries.
Quite apart from any temporary disenchantment with the present
government or dissatisfaction with particular leaders, most citizens in
the Trilateral world have become more distrustful of politicians, more
skeptical about political parties, and significantly less confident in their
parliament and other political institutions. Compared to the state of public
opinion at the time that CH&W wrote, the political mood in most of our
countries today is not just grumpy, but much grumpier.
Why Worry?
Although public concern over these trends is widespread, it is
nevertheless reasonable to step back and ask whether we should be
worried about the many signs of erosion in popular confidence in
government and the institutions of representative democracy. Some
observers would reply with a resounding “No,” offering three main
arguments. The first holds that a critical citizenry signals not illness in
the body politic but rather the health of democracy, and that the real
challenge is to explain not the long-term decline in confidence, but why
it was as high as it was in the 1950s and early 1960s, especially in the
United States. A variation on that same view sees changes in values,
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driven by prosperity, technology, and other factors, as having created a
more critical citizenry that rejects the political status quo and is also
forcing new issues such as environmentalism and women’s rights onto
the political agenda, thus reforming and revitalizing democracy.
A second objection holds that new forms of political participation
(such as referenda and “town-hall”–style fora) and an upsurge in certain
types of grassroots activism (including social movements that are more
broad-based than in the past) have supplanted previous forms of political
engagement. A third objection proceeds from a particular perspective
on the appropriate relation between government and citizens. The task
of government, this view holds, is to give citizens not necessarily what
they want, but what they need. Thus sound and appropriate policies are
the best measure of governmental performance. Confidence levels are
immaterial as long as the public supports the government enough to
comply with its laws, pay taxes, and accept conscription.
Although each of these arguments has merit, we see reason to worry
in the fact that voters’ “report cards” on their representative institutions
in the Trilateral democracies have generally become more critical—and
often much more critical—in recent decades. Although we do not believe
that this sour mood is a precursor of the collapse of Western democracy,
a decent respect for our fellow citizens’ views compels us to consider
why they are increasingly distrustful of, and discontented with, their
political institutions. If the decline in public confidence is justified
(because of growing corruption, for example), then we might applaud
citizens’ ire but not its cause, just as we would be glad to have discovered
a child’s fever without being glad that her temperature was high.
If citizens are less satisfied with their representative institutions, this
is a politically relevant and important fact. Yet few would argue that
popularity is the sole measure of democratic performance, and most of
us would admit that governments often must (or should) take actions
that might reduce their popularity in the short run. Opinions differ on
whether public satisfaction per se is a relevant measure of democratic
performance. Some believe that democracy is not (just) about making
citizens happy, and that it is also supposed to facilitate “good
government,” whether or not citizens are pleased with government
actions. Others endorse the more populist view that what is distinctive
about democracy is that the ultimate criterion of performance is citizens’
collective judgment, so if public confidence declines over the long run,
that is prima facie (though not irrefutable) evidence that the performance
of representative institutions has declined.
A Model for Explaining the Decline
For disaffection in particular countries, explanations have been offered
that are studded with proper nouns: Vietnam, Nixon, Craxi, Mulroney,
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Thatcher, Recruit, and so on. Such interpretations offer important insights
into the national catalysts for democratic distress, but it seems surprising
that so many independent democracies just happened to encounter rough
water or careless captains simultaneously. Although we do not discount
the importance of specific national factors, we seek more generalizable
explanations.
Unraveling the question of why confidence in government has
declined to varying degrees across the Trilateral world is a complex
task. In our view, public satisfaction with representative institutions is a
function of the information to which citizens are exposed, the criteria
by which the public evaluates government and politics, and the actual
performance of those institutions (see Figure 3). Thus, a decline in satis-
faction might be due to a change in any of these variables.
First, the accuracy and comprehensiveness of publicly available infor-
mation about democratic performance might have changed. Logically,
this might be due to either deterioration (worse information about good
performance) or improvement (better information about bad perfor-
mance), but the most common interpretation is that voters have over
time become better informed about their governments’ performance,
particularly about leaders’ conduct in office (for example, corruption),
even though malfeasance per se might not have worsened. Here, the
role of the media is clearly central.
Second, the public’s criteria for evaluation of politics and government
might have changed in ways that make it harder for representative
institutions to meet those standards. This in turn might be due to either
rising or diverging expectations (or both). If public demands on govern-
ment spiral insatiably upward, satisfaction could fall even if performance
remains unchanged. In part, this was the interpretation offered by
CH&W. If the heterogeneity of public desires increases, either by
polarization along a single dimension or by divergence across multiple
dimensions, then it becomes more difficult for government to identify
any feasible set of policies that would satisfy its constituents.
Third, the performance of representative institutions might have
deteriorated. Measuring performance objectively is a challenging task,
of course. Because it is reasonably well established in most of the Tri-
lateral countries that cyclical fluctuations in citizens’ evaluations of
incumbents correlate with macroeconomic indicators, one obvious
approach is to measure macroeconomic outcomes (inflation, unemploy-
ment, growth, and the like). A growing body of work, however, generally
discounts this as the primary explanation for the decline in public
confidence in political institutions.27 As Nye and his colleagues28 note
with regard to the United States, for example, the largest decline in con-
fidence occurred over the high-growth decade between 1964 and 1974;
confidence actually increased during the recession of the early 1980s.
Once these economic measures are set aside, there is little agreement
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over which dimensions of performance are relevant across countries,
time, and individual citizens. One obvious measure might be gains or
losses in social welfare. One might argue that levels of confidence have
remained high in countries in which social-welfare guarantees are secure
while they have dropped elsewhere as a result of rollbacks of the welfare
state. Yet testing such a hypothesis runs into the problem of how to
measure governmental performance on social welfare. If we use govern-
ment outlays, we run up against the fact that, despite the rhetoric hailing
“small government,” governmental transfers (which are heavily skewed
toward social programs) as a percentage of GNP have increased strikingly
in the Trilateral countries precisely over those decades in which con-
fidence has decreased. Alternatively, to measure results like increased
longevity and improved health would fail to take into account the many
factors other than government policies (diet and economic prosperity,
for example) that produce them. Another problem is choosing a point in
time at which policy success or failure can be judged. For example,
some people believe that the American war in Vietnam or the process of
German reunification constituted massive policy failures that contributed
powerfully to declining political confidence; other observers might argue
that, in the long run, these policy “failures” represent historic successes.
Thus objective measures of policy performance have obvious limits.
When searching for why citizens feel the way they do about their
government, their subjective appraisal of governmental performance is
what ultimately matters. The fact that public confidence has declined
can be taken to mean that governmental performance is less satisfactory
than it once was. We consider citizens’ falling confidence in government
to be focused specifically on political institutions and to have principally
political roots and therefore seek to identify broad explanations for the
FIGURE 3—EXPLAINING CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT
AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: A MODEL
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deterioration of governmental performance. These can be collected under
two rubrics.
The first of these is declines in the capacity of political agents to act
on behalf of citizens’ interests and desires (see Figure 3). Thus we seek
to identify forces that may have undermined the ability of national
governments to implement their chosen
policies and to respond to citizen demands
in a satisfactory way. The principal such
force is internationalization, which creates
a growing incongruence between the scope
of territorial units and the issues raised by
interdependence, reducing the output
effectiveness of democratic nation-states.
The second broad explanation concerns
declines in the fidelity with which political
agents act on citizens’ interests and desires.
Within this category fall arguments about
failures of political leadership, failures of
political judgment on the part of voters, and
deterioration of the civic infrastructure (or social capital) by means of
which interests are articulated and aggregated.
A final problem relating to the issue of fidelity arises from the complex
relationship among three sets of variables: confidence in government;
governmental performance; and civic engagement, social capital,29 and
social trust. A key issue is precisely how an erosion of social capital and
social trust may affect citizens’ confidence in government. Much
evidence to date suggests low levels overall of social capital and social
trust in any given society do indeed contribute to poor governmental
performance, which, in turn, adversely affects all citizens to varying
degrees; as a consequence, they will give the government low marks.
Metaphorically speaking, no citizen (no matter how high his or her own
social trust or civic engagement) can escape the rain precipitated by
poor governmental performance, perhaps produced in part by the social
disaffection or civic disengagement of his or her neighbors.
Over the quarter-century since CH&W issued their report, citizens’
confidence in governments, political parties, and political leaders has
declined significantly in most of the Trilateral democracies, even though
the depth and timing of this decline have varied considerably from
country to country. Some commentators may tell their fellow citizens
that the problem is “just in your head”—a function of unrealistic expec-
tations rather than deteriorating performance—but we are inclined to
think that our political systems are not, in fact, performing well, although
perhaps for reasons beyond their immediate control. These criticisms of
governments and leaders do not necessarily translate into a “crisis of
democracy” that threatens constitutional and representative government.
Some commentators
may tell their
fellow citizens that
the problem is “just
in your head” . . .
but we are inclined
to think that our
political systems
are not, in fact,
performing well.
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Nevertheless, the fact that representative democracy per se is not at risk
does not imply that all is well with our political systems. Indeed, most
of our fellow citizens believe that all is not well. Due regard for their
views, as well as a prudent concern for the future, suggests that we should
explore the sources of this democratic discontent.
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